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IS TRUSTEE INDEPENDENCE A
PREREQUISITE TO DEDUCTIBLE GIFTLEASEBACK RENTAL PAYMENTS?:
MAY V. COMMISSIONER
The gift-leaseback arrangement is a commonly used tax saving
device which effectively splits income among family members.1
Typically, the donor makes a gift of the property used in his business2 to a trust created for the benefit of his children,3 and the
trustee simultaneously leases the property back to the grantor for
use in his business. The trust income will be taxed to the beneficiary or to the trust at a lower tax rate than that of the donor.4 An
I Professionals or persons who operate their own trade or business are the primary
users of the gift-leaseback device. E.g., Butler v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 327, 328 (1975);
Felix v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 794, 798 (1954). It is possible for an employee who does not
control his own business but who nevertheless uses personal property in the course of his
employment to successfully avail himself of the gift-leaseback device. This case is not likely
to arise, however, because the depreciation deduction for property with a short life would be
approximately equal to a rental deduction, and therefore it would not be worthwhile to
create a trust.
While the tax treatment of sale-leaseback arrangements is similar in some respects to
the treatment of gift-leasebacks, this Comment will discuss gift-leasebacks only. For a general discussion of sale-leasebacks, see Note, Taxation of Sale and Leaseback Transactions-A GeneralReview, 32 VAND. L. REV. 945 (1979).
2 The property transferred generally is expensive equipment, land or a building. See
generally Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 346, 347 (1978), afl'd, 599 F.2d 269
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 824, 824
(1963), aff'd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965); Skemp v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 415, 416 (1947), rev'd, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
' In many cases, the trust is a short term, reversionary Clifford trust. The trust derives
its name from Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), wherein a grantor transferred securities to a 5-year trust, naming his wife as beneficiary. Id. at 332. The grantor named
himself as trustee and retained the right to receive the corpus on termination of the trust.
Id. Based on the retention of control by the grantor, the short duration of the trust, and the
fact that the wife was the beneficiary, the Clifford Court held that the grantor and not the
beneficiary would be deemed to be the owner of the property and would be taxed on the
income produced. Id. at 335. Sections 671-678 of the Internal Revenue Code set forth the
minimum requirements for short term trusts where the income will be taxable to the trust
or to the beneficiary. A violation of these requirements will result in taxation to the grantor
based on his retention of control over the trust property, and will thus defeat the grantor's
purpose in creating the trust. See I.R.C. §§ 671-678.
4 See, e.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 333-34 (1940). If the gift-leaseback transaction is entered into for the purpose of lowering the family income tax liability, then the
beneficiaries must be in a lower income tax bracket than the grantor. The gross income of a
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additional objective of a gift-leaseback transaction is to permit the
donor to deduct from his income the rental payments made to the
trust as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section
162(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code).5 Although
courts have considered a variety of factors in determining whether
such a transaction meets the requirements for deductibility of
rental payments,8 particular significance has been attached to the
trust is determined "in the same manner as in the case of an individual," I.R.C. § 641(b),
and includes "income which is to be distributed currently ... to the beneficiaries," I.R.C. §
641(a)(2). If all of the income of a trust is required to be distributed currently, however, that
amount may be deducted from the trust's taxable income as long as the trust has no power
to make charitable donations. I.R.C. § 651(a). For a computation of after-tax savings, see
Note, Quinlivan v. C.I.R.: Limiting Tax Liability Through Gift and Leaseback, 25 S.D.L.
REV. 91, 92 & n.8 (1980).
' I.R.C. § 162(a)(3). Section 162(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,
including -

(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property to
which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no
equity.
I.R.C. § 162(a)(3); see Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 966 (1979). For excellent criticisms of judicially created gift-leaseback tax shelters
see Case Note, Use of a Trust and Lease-Back as a Tax Avoidance Device, 51 COLUM. L.
REV. 247, 249 (1951); Note, The Gift and Leaseback: A New Tax Avoidance Gimmick, 59
YALE L.J. 1529, 1533 (1950).

6 See, e.g., Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 996 (1979); Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440, 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 814 (1965); Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 599 (7th Cir. 1948); Mathews v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 12, 18-19 (1973), rev'd, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 967 (1976). The Tax Court's standard for deductibility of rent was set forth in Mathews v. Commissioner. Id.; see notes 25-29 and accompanying text infra. Apart from the
Mathews criteria, other factors to be considered include the grantor's reversionary interest,
Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1972), the powers of the trustee,
Furman v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 360, 365 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir.
1967), and whether the grantor is the sole occupant of the rental property, see Van Zandt v.
Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
Examining the language of section 162(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, the Eighth
Circuit formulated its own standard for deductibility of rental payments:
(1) the payments are required to be made for the continued use or possession of
the property; (2) the continued use or possession of the property is for the purposes of the trade or business; (3) the taxpayer has not taken and is not taking
title to the property; and (4) the taxpayer has no equity in the property.
Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
The Quinlivan court did not expressly adopt the Mathews requirements, but stated that if
the Mathews test were not satisfied, the statutory requirements would not be met either. Id.
at 273.
In the earliest case involving the gift-leaseback, the Seventh Circuit considered such
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degree to which the trustee is independent of the grantor.7 There is
some confusion, however, whether the presence of an independent
trustee is a prerequisite to the rental deduction8 or merely a factor
to be considered by a court.9 Recently, in May v. Commissioner,0
the Tax Court held that rental payments made to an irrevocable
trust created for the benefit of the grantor's children were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses, but upon noting
that the trustee in the instant case was sufficiently independent,11
the court implied
that trustee independence may not be required
12
in every case.

Dr. Lewis May and his wife owned the land and building in
which Dr. May's medical practice was situated.' s In 1970, they executed a declaration of trust, transferring all of their rights, title,
factors as whether rent was required and whether there was a true change in economic status. Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 598-600 (7th Cir. 1948). On the latter point, the
court was persuaded by the fact that the grantor gave away his entire interest in the property and had assumed an obligation to pay rent. Id. at 600. The fact that the obligation was
created voluntarily by the taxpayer's gift was stated to be irrelevant to the issue of deductibility of rentals. Id. In a similar case, White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952), the Second Circuit distinguished Skemp on the grounds that
White did not involve a trustee. Id. at 401. The court disallowed the deduction of royalty
and rental payments made from husband to wife because there was no evidence that the
wife controlled the property and because the husband retained beneficial enjoyment. Id.
The Second Circuit has not otherwise spoken in this area.
Since the deductibility issue has not been resolved by either the Supreme Court or
Congress, the Internal Revenue Service considers the deductibility of rental payments in
gift-leasebacks one of its "prime issues" for litigation. I.R.S. Prime Issue List, Nov. 19, 1974,
reprinted in [1979] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 195.
1 Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1972); see, e.g., Perry v. United
States, 520 F.2d 235, 238 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976); Engle v. United
States, 400 F. Supp. 5, 6 (W.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem., 562 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc);
Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 824, 830 (1963), a/i'd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965). Since it is difficult to determine when a trustee will be considered independent, it is wise to use a bank or a corporate trustee, e.g., Serbousek v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 479, 480 (1977); Felix v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 794, 804 (1954),
but this will not ensure a finding of independence. See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 208 F.
Supp. 584, 587 (N.D.N.Y. 1962); Butler v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 327, 330 (1975).
8 See, e.g., Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1972); Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 599 (7th Cir. 1948); Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 824, 830
(1963), a/i'd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965); Felix v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 794, 803-04 (1954).
9 See, e.g., Goodman v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 684, 708-09 (1980); Penn v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 144, 153 (1968).
10 76 T.C. 7 (1981).
11 Id. at 15.
12

See id.

13

Id.

at 8. The property was valued at $46,504 and encumbered by trust deed notes

totalling $21,619. Id. at 9.
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and interest in the property to four irrevocable trusts created for
the benefit of their four children. 14 The declaration of trust named
Dr. May and his friend Mr. Gross as co-trustees of the four
15
trusts,'
granting them broad powers of management and administration.' 6 Although the grantor and the trustees never executed a
written lease,17 Dr. May continued his medical practice at that location as the sole occupant," leasing the property from the trust at
a rental of $1,000 per month."
The Mays claimed a deduction for rental payments made to
the trusts in 1973.20 The Commissioner disallowed the deduction,
arguing that the transfer should not be recognized for tax purposes
because even if there had been an effective transfer in trust, the
21
grantors never sufficiently relinquished control of the property.
In the performance of his duties as trustee, there was evidence that
Mr. Gross was aware of his duties as a fiduciary, that he "felt independent" of Dr. May, and that four times a year he ascertained
whether rental payments had been made by Dr. May to the trust.2 2
A divided Tax Court 23 upheld the deductibility of these payments
as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section
162(a)(3).24
" Id. at 8.Although the trust was formed in 1970, no deed was executed until September 20, 1973. Id. at 10. The declaration of trust stated that the grantors "have delivered" the
property to the trustees. This created an issue whether the instrument validly transferred
an interest in property to the trust. Id. at 12.
" Id. at 8.
16 Id. at 9-10. In particular, the trustees were granted "all the rights, powers and privileges" of an absolute owner, as limited by their fiduciary obligations. Id. at 10.
11Id. at 11. Although there was no written lease, a valid lease agreement was "understood" between the parties. Id. at 14.
8 Id. at 10-11. It should be noted that, if other tenants besides the grantor occupy the
trust property, a basis for finding a business purpose for the gift may exist. See Van Zandt
v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
" May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7, 11 (1981). The parties stipulated that the amount of
$1000 per month represented a reasonable rental fee for the property. Id. at 12.
20 Id. at 11.
21 Id. at 12. The Commissioner also argued that no valid trust was created because
there was no effective transfer in trust under California law. Id. The court disposed of this
argument, finding a valid transfer. Id. at 15.
22Id. at 14-15. There was evidence that Mr. Gross had been a trustee for other trusts
and was aware of the fiduciary obligations of the position. Id. at 14.
2'There were five written opinions in May. Judge Ekman authored the majority opinion. A concurring opinion was written by Judge Goffe, with which Judges Irwin and Wiles
agreed. Judges Simpson and Wilbur each wrote dissenting opinions and, with Judge Parker,
concurred in each opinion. Judge Chabot dissented in a separate opinion, and Judge
Dawson did not participate.
24May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7, 15 (1981).
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Writing for the majority, Judge Ekman applied the criteria set
forth in Mathews v. Commissioner,2 5 wherein four factors were
said to determine the deductibility of rental payments: the control
retained by the grantor must not be substantially the same as
before he made the gift;2* the lease normally should be in writing
2
and always must require payment of a reasonable rental amount; 7
there must be a bona fide business purpose for the lease; 28 and the
grantor must not retain a disqualifying equity in the property
within the meaning of section 162(a)(3).2 The court easily disposed of the latter three requirements in favor of Dr. and Mrs.
May.30 Judge Ekman gave greater consideration to whether the
grantors relinquished sufficient control over the trust property.
Since the taxpayers irrevocably transferred their entire interest,
retaining no reversion, and because Dr. May was not the sole trus25

61 T.C. 12 (1973), rev'd, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967

(1976); see note 6 supra.
28 See Mathews v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 12, 18 (1973), rev'd, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976) (quoting Penn v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 144, 150
(1968)).
2 See 61 T.C. at 18.
28 See id. at 19. But cf. note 6 supra (some circuits require business purpose for gift as
well).
29 See Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 346, 348 (1978), afl'd, 599 F.2d 269
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
30 May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7, 13-14 (1981). A written lease is "normally" required

because it is necessary for the purpose of proving the existence of a binding agreement to
pay a rental amount. Id. at 18 (Goffe, J., concurring). Noting that a written lease is not an
absolute requirement, Judge Ekman considered that the parties "clearly understood" and
"faithfully observed" the terms of their lease, and therefore, a writing would be unnecessary.
Id. at 14. See Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1972). But cf. Wiles v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 289, 298 (1972), aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974) (lack of
formality in rental arrangement was a factor in disallowance of deduction). See also May v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. at 19 (Goffe, J., concurring).
In discussing the reasonableness of the rental amount, Judge Ekman stated that while
independence of the trustee is a factor in making this determination, the question of trustee
independence need not be answered for this part of the test because the Commissioner had
conceded that the rental payments were reasonable. Id. at 14. The requirement of a reasonable rental amount stems from the statutory mandate that rent be "required." See Skemp v.
Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1948); cf. Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d
269, 273 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (the fact of a gift raises the issue of
whether rent was required to be paid).
A valid business purpose for the leaseback was found by Judge Ekman in that the property was necessary for the continuation of Dr. May's medical practice. May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. at 13-14. The May court again rejected the requirement of a business purpose for the gift. Id. at 13 & n.3. Finally, Judge Ekman found that the grantors did not
retain a disqualifying equity because the equitable owners under the trust instrument were
the children. Id. at 13.
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tee, this Mathews factor was considered satisfied.3 1 Judge Ekman
noted that the independence of the trustee is frequently a factor in
determining whether a grantor has retained control over the property.32 Finding Mr. Gross to be sufficiently independent of Dr.
May, however, he concluded that it was unnecessary to decide
whether such independence would be required in all cases.33
In a concurring opinion, Judge Goffe posited that the control
element of Mathews should be merged with its requirement that
the grantor not retain a disqualifying equity.3 ' He reasoned that
the control factor arose from a judicial concern that the tax treatment of trust transactions must depend on whether these transfers
have substance. 5 When there was a "lack of apparent substance,"
he noted, the grantor would be deemed to have an equity for purposes of trust income and business deductions because he retained
constructive ownership.3 6 Judge Goffe looked to Helvering v. Clifford,37 where the Supreme Court held that a grantor must be taxed
on trust income when he retains a reversion, maintains control
31Id. at 14-15.
52

Id. at 14; see Lerner v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 290, 302 (1978) (dictum); Quinlivan v.

Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 346, 348 (1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 996 (1979); Mathews v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 12, 18 (1973), rev'd, 520 F.2d 323
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
" May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7, 15 (1981).
3, Id. at 31 (Goffe, J., concurring). Judge Goffe traced the origins of the Mathews test,
see id. at 17 (Goffe, J., concurring), giving particular attention to the requirement that the
grantor not retain substantially the same control over the trust property that he had before
he made the gift, id. at 23-33 (Goffe, J., concurring). He stated that the majority's treatment
of the control element as a separate factor was an analytical error. Id. at 31 (Goffe, J.,
concurring).
3 Id. at 26 (Goffe, J., concurring). Judge Goffe stated that the requirement that the
grantor relinquish control derives from a combination of the Clifford doctrine of treating a
grantor with control over trust property as owner for the purpose of taxation on the income
and the rationale of Johnson v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1936). In Johnson, a
taxpayer who borrowed money from a trust was deemed to be the true owner of the funds
because of his continued control. He, therefore, was not allowed an interest deduction. Id. at
713. In both cases, Judge Goffe reasoned, the lack of substance in the gift justified continued treatment of the grantor as owner. May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. at 23 (Goffe, J., concurring). Relating this to gift and leasebacks, Judge Goffe reasoned that if a grantor retains
substantial control over property which he has placed in trust, he will be denied a rental
deduction because he will be deemed to be the true owner and therefore will possess a disqualifying equity in the property. Id. at 23 (Goffe, J., concurring).
The idea of treating the "control" and "equity" facets of the Mathews test as one is not
a new idea in the Tax Court. See Penn v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 144, 149-50 (1968); Skemp
v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 415, 421 (1947), rev'd, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
31 See May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7, 22 (1981) (Goffe, J., concurring).
37 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
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over the property by acting as trustee, and names a relative as beneficiary.3 8 In the Clifford situation, Judge Goffe noted, the grantor
is taxed because there is no substance to the transfer and there is
justification for treating the grantor as the owner of the property
for tax purposes.3 9 He reasoned, however, that when control or retention of the reversion is absent, the principles of Clifford are "inapposite."4 0 Thus, Judge Goffe concluded that when a grantor divests himself of "perpetual control" by appointing an independent
trustee, or does not retain a reversionary interest, thereby removing the property from his "eventual ownership," there is no reason
to treat him as possessing an equity in the property for purposes of
section 162(a)(3).41 Therefore, since Dr. and Mrs. May did not retain a reversion, he reasoned that trustee independence was irrelevant to the deductibility of rent.4 2
All of the dissenting judges agreed that the lack of trustee independence in May should be a material factor in disallowance of
the deduction.4 3 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Simpson stated
that the transaction did not have sufficient economic reality."4 This
was so, he reasoned, because the grantor did not really part with
control, as evidenced by the absence of a written lease.4 5 Judge
Wilbur agreed, observing that the failure of Mr. Gross to determine whether the deed was acknowledged or whether a lease had
been executed indicated a lack of trustee independence and a retention of control by the grantor.46 Judge Chabot contended that
See id. at 335; note 3 supra.
See May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7, 22-23 (1981) (Goffe, J., concurring).
'0 Id. at 26 (Goffe, J., concurring). Judge Goffe noted that the significant facts in Clifford were that the grantor retained a reversionary interest and appointed himself as trustee.
See id. (Goffe, J., concurring). Thus, the absence of either of these facts, he reasoned, obviates treating the grantor as owner under the Clifford doctrine. Id. (Goffe, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 30 (Goffe, J., concurring). See note 40 supra.
42 May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7, 32 (1981) (Goffe, J., concurring).
43 See id. at 34 (Simpson, J., dissenting); id. at 37-39; (Wilbur, J., dissenting); id. at 41

(Chabot, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 33-34 (Simpson, J., dissenting). Judge Simpson also found that a valid trust
was not created under California law due to a defect in the conveyance. See id. at 34-35
(Simpson, J., dissenting); but see id. at 15 (Judge Ekman found a valid transfer).
" See id. at 33-34 (Simpson J., dissenting). Judge Simpson reasoned that a written

lease is necessary in gift-leaseback transactions to show the terms of the lease and to evaluate the grantor's control. See id. at 34 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
46 See id. at 37-38 (Wilbur, J., dissenting). Judge Wilbur also placed importance on the
absence of a written lease. See id. at 36-37 (Wilbur, J., dissenting). A written lease was

mandated, according to Judge Wilbur, due to business exigencies and to the California statute of frauds. Id. at 37 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
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Mr. Gross' independence was purely a matter of form and caused
the requirement of an independent trustee to serve no purpose in
47
reality.

Although discounted by the May majority and concurrence, 8
it is submitted that trustee independence is a necessary precondition to the deductibility of gift-leaseback rental payments. Indeed,
trustee independence was cited when gift-leasebacks first were
sanctioned over three decades ago in Skemp v. Commissioner 9
and Brown v. Commissioner." Moreover, an even earlier attempt
47 Id. at 41 (Chabot, J., dissenting). Judge Chabot noted that a majority of the court
adhered to the requirement of an independent trustee, but found that Mr. Gross' actions
did not satisfy the Mathews test. See id. (Chabot, J., dissenting). Like Judge Ekman, however, he did not commit himself to the requirement of an independent trustee in every case.
See id. (Chabot, J., dissenting).
48 See id. at 15; id. at 31-32 (Goffe, J., concurring).
49 168 F.2d 598, 599 (7th Cir. 1948); see text accompanying notes 60-62 infra.
50 180 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); see notes 63 & 64 and
accompanying text infra. Courts place great emphasis on trustee independence in determining whether to allow rental deductions in gift-leaseback transactions. See, e.g., Brooke v.
United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 1972); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398,
402 n.2 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952); Felix v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 794,
804 (1954). This element has been described as a material fact, see Engel v. United States,
400 F. Supp. 5, 6 (W.D. Pa. 1975), and a pivotal issue, see Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d
1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1972).
Independence has not been considered a major factor in those jurisdictions which effectively have disallowed all gift-leaseback rental deductions by requiring a business purpose
for the entire transaction. In Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976), the court stated that independence was not a crucial factor.
Id. at 238. Rather, the obligation to pay rent was not viewed as required under a single
transaction with a real business purpose. See id. The business purpose requirement is derived from the language of section 162(a)(3), which states that rent must be paid for purposes of the taxpayer's trade or business. See Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269, 272
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); I.R.C. § 162(a)(3). For the entire transaction to
have "economic reality" in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, a business purpose is required for
the gift portion as well as the leaseback. See Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d 235, 238-39
(4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976); Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d
440, 443-44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965). Nonetheless, given that a tax recognized gift must "[proceed] from a 'detached and disinterested generosity,'" Commissioner v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Commissioner v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243, 246
(1956)), and that it is difficult to establish a business purpose for a gift, it is submitted that
the requirement of a business purpose for the entire transaction reflects a policy decision to
disallow rental deductions in the gift-leaseback context. In Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d
235 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976), however, the court indicated that a
business purpose might be established when a grantor transfers more property to the trust
than he leases back. See id. at 239. Thus, the transfer of responsibility for management and
administration of property which is not leased back may be considered a valid business
purpose for the entire transaction. See id.; Note, Gifts and Leasebacks: Is JudicialConsensus Impossible?, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 379, 391 (1980).
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in Johnson v. Commissioner51 to employ the gift-leaseback device
to create rental deductions failed in large measure because of the
absence of trustee independence. 52 The gift-leaseback disallowed in
Johnson involved an arrangement wherein X, the grantor, borrowed money from a bank and made a gift of the money to an
irrevocable and nonreversionary family trust.5 3 The trust agreement provided that X could at any time borrow "the whole or any
part of the principal of the trust estate. 5 4 Exercising this provision, X borrowed the entire amount of money he had initially put
into the trust and returned the reacquired funds to the original
lending bank.5 5 X paid interest to the family trust and attempted
to deduct the interest payments from his gross income.56 The Second Circuit prohibited the deduction, reasoning that X retained
control over the funds and that the trustee was not "free from a
duty to return" the trust corpus to X. 5 7 Notably, these two interrelated factors, the absence of grantor control and the presence of
trustee independence, were extant in Skemp and Brown. 5 Not coincidentally, the Skemp and Brown gift-leaseback deductions were
upheld.5 9 In Skemp, Y, the grantor, donated his medical office
building to an irrevocable family trust, leaving the remainder to
his children after twenty years, and immediately leased back the
property.6 0 Y sought to deduct his rental payments to the trust.6 "
The Seventh Circuit permitted the deduction, reasoning that since
1 86 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1936).
52 See id. at 712. The Johnson court reasoned that because X, the grantor, never relin-

quished control over the donated property, the gift portion of the transaction was invalid.
Thus, any payments for use of the donated money were gratuitous and not required interest
payments. See id. at 713.
53Id. at 711.
4 Id.
11 Id. at 712.
56Id.
11 Id. at 712-13. Because the gift portion was deemed invalid, the Johnson court reasoned that the note was given without consideration. See id. at 713. Thus, the interest payments were not considered required and could not be deducted. See id.
18 See Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814
(1950); Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 599-600 (7th Cir. 1948). The terms "grantor
control" and "absence of independent trustee" are frequently used interchangeably. The
Tax Court has stated that the requirement of a relinquishment of control by the grantor is
often met through appointment of an independent trustee. See Mathews v. Commissioner,
61 T.C. 12, 18 (1973), rev'd, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
11 Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814
(1950); Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 599-600 (7th Cir. 1948).
60 Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 599 (7th Cir. 1948).
61 Id.
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Y could use the trust corpus "only upon payment of rent, the
amount of which was to be fixed by the trustee," Y was not in
control of the trust corpus and the trustee was, in effect, independent.6 2 Similarly, in Brown, Z, the grantor, conveyed land to an
irrevocable and nonreversionary trust with the "understanding"
that a lease back to Z would be executed. 3 Echoing the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning in Skemp, the Third Circuit permitted Z to deduct reasonable business-related rental payments made to the
trust, citing the existence of a "new independent owner, the
trustee.""
Interestingly, while the May concurrence stated that the absence of a reversionary interest in the grantor could supplant the
need for trustee independence,6 5 neither the Johnson, Skemp, nor
Brown courts attached particular significance to whether a reversion to the grantor was part of the trust agreement.6 6 Although all
62

See id. at 599-600. The court stated that unless a fiduciary violation was to be im-

puted to the trustee, he could not allow Y to use the premises except on payment of rent.
The payments therefore were not gratuitous as in Johnson. See id. at 599; note 52 supra.
63 Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814
(1950).
" See id. at 929. The court noted that the trustee's requirement of rental and royalty
payments regardless of the success of the taxpayers' operations was an indication of the
trustee's independence. See id.
65 76 T.C. 7, 30 (1981) (Goffe, J., concurring). Notably, in Penn v. Commissioner, 51
T.C. 144 (1968), the court stated in dictum that had the taxpayer transferred his reversionary interest, a rental deduction would still be denied because he retained excessive control.
Id. at 154. Similarly, in White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 928 (1952), no reversionary interest in the property was retained by the donor but
there was no independent trustee and the deduction was denied, partially because there was
no change in control over the property. See id. at 402. But see Hall v. United States, 208 F.
Supp.. 584, 588 (N.D.N.Y. 1962) (reliance on lack of independence of trust company and
grantor's reversionary interest to deny a deduction). This seems to be at variance with
Judge Goffe's statement that sufficient control is relinquished by transferring a reversionary
interest. See May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. at 30 (Goffe, J., concurring).
6 In Skemp, the court noted that the trust wholly divested the grantor of any interest
in the property and that there was thus a real change in his economic status. Skemp v.
Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1948). Greater emphasis, however, was placed on
the existence of a trustee who would require the payment of rent. See id. at 599-600. In
Brown, the fact that the grantor had no reversionary interest in the property was not discussed by the court. Rather, the court emphasized that "[w]hat is controlling is that there
came into the picture a new independent owner, the trustee." Brown v. Commissioner, 180
F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950). In Johnson, the trust technically
was nonreversionary to the grantor. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 710, 712 (2d Cir.
1936). Nonetheless, the Johnson court clearly disregarded the absence of a reversionary interest and disallowed the gift-leaseback on the basis of trustee dependence. See id. Indeed,
had the grantor in Johnson not retained control over the trust corpus and had the trustee of
the trust been independent, it appears that the Johnson court would have approved of the
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three gift-leasebacks were nonreversionary, the courts in all three
6 7
cases stressed the presence or absence of trustee independence,
not of a reversionary interest in the grantor.6 8 Indeed, considerations other than trustee independence were cited by the Johnson,
patently obvious tax avoidance scheme, for the court stated that:
If such were indeed the legal relations of the parties, it would follow as of course
that the taxpayer should be allowed the claimed deduction, for it is too well settled to require discussion that legal transactions cannot be upset merely because
the parties have entered into them for the purpose of minimizing or avoiding taxes
which might otherwise accrue.
Id. (citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)).
" See note 66 supra. One commentator has noted that since "the trust and lease-back
are both steps in a prearranged transaction, the 'independence' of the trustee. . . [is] more
apparent than real." Case Note, Use of a Trust and Lease-Back as a Tax Avoidance Device,
51 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 249 (1951). Another commentator has asserted that trustee independence is ineffective to prohibit grantors from enjoying the income from properties they have
donated to trusts. Note, The Gift and Leaseback: A New Tax Avoidance Gimmick, 59 YALE
L.J. 1529, 1530 n.4 (1950). The latter commentator, an early critic of gift-leaseback arrangements, observed:
The donor may compel use of the [trust] income for his own purposes by economic or moral pressure on family members. He may just as effectively enjoy the
income without express instructions as to its use, by donating it in lieu of funds he
would otherwise have supplied-like an allowance.
Id. Regardless of such criticisms, the gift-leaseback and its concomitant of trustee independence have come to be accepted by the Tax Court and by most circuit courts. See notes 6 &
7 and accompanying text supra.
6" The presence or absence of a reversionary interest does affect the viability of the giftleaseback tax avoidance shelter since gift-leaseback trusts of 10 years or less duration will
result in taxation of the trust income to the grantor under the Clifford provisions of the
Code. I.R.C. §§ 671-678; note 3 supra. Because all of the grantor's rental deductions would
then become his taxable trust income, his gross income would remain unchanged. Therefore,
upon distilling gift-leasebacks into four categories, it is evident that only one category contains an effective tax avoidance vehicle. Using trustee independence and grantor reversion
as intersecting axes, the four resultant gift-leaseback species are:
(1) dependent trustee, reversionary in ten years or less;
(2) dependent trustee, reversionary after ten years or nonreversionary;
(3) independent trustee, reversionary in ten years or less;
(4) independent trustee, reversionary after ten years or nonreversionary.
The first class of gift-leasebacks is an ineffective tax avoidance device due both to the Johnson-Skemp-Brown trustee independence rule and the Clifford provisions of the Code. See
I.R.C. §§ 671-678; note 66 supra. The second class is ineffective due to the trustee independence rule. The Johnson gift-leaseback was within this category. See notes 51-57 supra.The
third class of gift-leasebacks is ineffective pursuant to the Clifford provisions of the Code.
See I.R.C. §§ 671-678. Only the fourth class of gift-leasebacks is effective for tax avoidance
purposes. The gift-leasebacks upheld in Skemp and Brown were within this category. See
notes 59-64 supra. Nevertheless, Judge Goffe questioned the necessity for trustee independence here. May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7, 30 (1981) (Goffe, J., concurring). Clearly, such
uncertainty is unfounded in light of the oft-cited Johnson, Skemp, and Brown decisions, all
of which relied heavily upon the presence or absence of trustee independence. See note 66
supra.
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Skemp, and Brown courts.6 9 Nonetheless, such considerations
clearly were subsidiary.70 It is submitted that these early gift-leaseback decisions held trustee independence to be a necessary, if not
sufficient, ingredient in gift-leaseback transactions.
The propriety of dictating trustee independence becomes apparent when one considers that a principal factor in ascertaining
the validity of any tax-avoidance scheme is whether the transaction has substance. 1 Surely, gift-leasebacks are not exempt from
this requirement,7 2 and given that gift-leaseback tax shelters could
not exist but for the fact that the tax law, in this instance, is subservient to the legal niceties of the trust law, it is fitting that grantors should be prohibited from eschewing such legal niceties when it
suits their needs. 3 In this vein, it is urged that trustee independence is a necessary element of substantive gift-leaseback arrangements. 74 Indeed, an independent trustee cannot be influenced to
"

In Johnson, the interest payments to the trust were used by the trustee to pay life

insurance premiums. Thus, the device was cited as an attempt by the taxpayer to create a
rental deduction for what was in reality a nondeductible expense. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 710, 711 (2d Cir. 1936). In Skemp, the court characterized the Johnson device as a "formal sham," Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1948), and
distinguished it from the Skemp transaction which the court found "involved substance,"
see id.at 600. See also Fabreeka Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 876, 878 (1st Cir.
1961) (citing Johnson v. Commissioner for the proposition that sham transactions cannot
create tax benefits); Lynch v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1959) (noting that
the Johnson court "looked at the end result rather than at an intermediate stage having no
practical significance"). Relying principally on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Skemp, the
Brown court looked to the express language of section 162(a)(3) as well as to the fact that
the trusts were created in good faith and upheld the deduction. See Brown v. Commissioner,
180 F.2d 926, 929-30 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950).
70 See note 66 supra.
71 See Mathews v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 967 (1976) (courts must examine taxable transactions "with substance rather than form
in mind"); Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834
(1955) ("[tlax consequences are determined not from the formal aspect of a transaction, but
from the actual substance of a piece of business"); Furman v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 360,
366 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967).
72 See Mathews v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 967 (1976); Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1948).
" See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), wherein the Court commented that
"[tiechnical considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or conveyances, or the legal paraphernalia which inventive genius may construct ... should not obscure the basic issue" of
whether, for tax purposes, the grantor is the owner of property. Id. at 334.
74 Of course, all of the circumstances surrounding a transaction must be examined to
determine whether a transaction has substance. See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 336
(1940). Nonetheless, it is submitted that when the grantor retains possession as lessee and
control as trustee, there is no substance to the transfer for purposes of a rental deduction,
regardless of whether a reversionary interest is retained. This is because the combination of
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take actions against the best interests of a trust, such as installing
fixtures, maintaining the curtilage, and excusing a grantor from
lease obligations.7 5 Trustee independence also comports with the
Restatement of Trusts, which states that trustees who lease property to themselves have breached a fiduciary duty owed to trust
beneficiaries."6 Clearly, if such fiduciary responsibilities could be
breached freely, the substance of the gift-leaseback would be
diminished.
The question has arisen whether trustee independence is necessary to imbue a gift-leaseback with substance, or whether some
less exacting standard might suffice. The concurring opinion in
May, for instance, contended that the Mathews disqualifying equity standard did not presuppose trustee independence in all inthe rights of a lessee and the powers of a trustee add up to virtually the same rights and
powers as those of a true owner. A lessee has a right to possession and use of property. See
R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1 225, at 97-101 (Rohan ed. 1968). Conversely, a
trustee may not use trust property for his own profit or benefit. See G.G. BOGERT & G.T.
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543, at 200 (2d ed. 1978). Thus, as lessee, the
grantor retains the right to beneficial use of the property. What he has transferred to the
trust is title, so he can no longer dispose of the property. The trustee, however, is often
given this power in the trust instrument. See, e.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 33233 (1940). Thus, as both lessee and trustee, the grantor has the right to use the property and
to dispose of it, the same powers which he had before making the gift. Indeed, the only
thing the grantor has given up is'the right to make a gift of the property. In Clifford, however, the Court noted that the inability to make a gift of the property and to make loans to
himself "[seemed] to be insignificant and immaterial, since control over investment remained." Id. at 335.
It is submitted that by transferring the reversion under these circumstances, the only
property interest transferred is a future interest. Until this interest becomes possessory, or
unless an independent trustee is appointed, there is no substantial change during the period
in which deductions are claimed. Thus, it is suggested that where the grantor can act as
owner for all other purposes, he should also be treated as owner for tax purposes.
75 When a grantor acts as both trustee and lessee, he has the power to deal with the
trust property in order to protect his leasehold interest. Because there is no arm's-length
negotiation, the grantor has absolute control over the lease terms. While rent must be reasonable to meet the statutory requirements for deductibility, I.R.C. § 162(a)(3), there is no
such control over other lease terms. Indeed, the possibilities for the exercise of grantor control are numerous. First, by granting himself an option to renew, the grantor can ensure that
the property will be available for as long as he desires. Second, a dependent trustee may
excuse an influential grantor/lessee from rent or other lease obligations if his business is
failing. See Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814
(1950). Third, if an opportunity to sell the property arises, the grantor may decide not to
sell in order to retain his possession and control of the property, despite the fact that it may
be beneficial to the trust to sell it. Fourth, the grantor may want to benefit his possessory
interest by improving the property or buying equipment for use in his business at the trust's
expense. Cf. Lerner v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 290, 295 (1978) (independent trustee refused
to buy equipment which was too expensive for trust fund).
71 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170, Comment 1 (1959).
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stances.77 Nevertheless, it is urged that the May concurrence unjustifiably obscured the fact that trustee independence is essential
to the deductibility of gift-leaseback rental payments by subsuming this requirement within the Mathews disqualifying equity
test. 78 Indeed, it is suggested that if an absence of trustee independence is not alone sufficient to constitute a disqualifying equity,
then the disqualifying equity standard itself is insufficient to lend
substance to gift-leaseback transactions. Admittedly, the disqualifying equity standard is derived from a section of the Code which
is employed in determining the validity of rental deductions, a section which mentions neither trustee independence nor grantor control.79 Nonetheless, this Code provision was enacted long before
gift-leasebacks first were sanctioned by the courts.8 0 Surely, therefore, the prerequisites of tax effective gift-leasebacks set forth in
the seminal Skemp and Brown decisions should be accorded more
weight than a test contained within an antecedent provision of the
Code, especially since these courts were aware of the possibility
that, without adequate safeguards, gift-leaseback arrangements
' It appears appropriate, therefore, that
could be mere "shams."81
the trustee independence precondition espoused by the Skemp and
Brown courts should control.8 2 Otherwise, if a grantor with no disqualifying equity were permitted to be a lessee and trustee of the
gift-leaseback corpus, he would be motivated and able to enhance
this present possessory interest to the detriment of the trust.83 In7 See May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7, 30 (1981) (Goffe, J., concurring). Judge Goffe
stated that if there is a change in the grantor's control over the property, the grantor will
not retain a disqualifying equity and the transfer will have substance. The rationale is that
if the grantor relinquishes "eventual ownership," that constitutes a sufficient change in control, even without an independent trustee. See id. (Goffe, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 28 (Goffe, J., concurring). Judge Goffe stated:
[the] first prong of the Mathews test [grantor control] should not be considered as
an independent test, but rather as a factor to be considered under the fourth
prong of the Mathews test, i.e., whether the grantor has a disqualifying equity in
the rented property within the meaning of section 162(a)(3).
Id. (Goffe, J., concurring); see note 35 supra.
7 I.R.C. § 162(a)(3); see note 5 supra.
80See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 23(a)(1), 53 Stat. 12 (now LR.C. § 162(a)(3)).
81See, e.g., Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1948); note 69 supra.
82See notes 60-64 and accompanying text supra.
83 Judge Goffe reasoned that as trustee and remainderman, a grantor would have more
motivation and ability to deal with trust property to benefit his remainder interest. See 76
T.C. 7, 30 n.6 (1981) (Goffe, J., concurring). It is submitted, however, that the danger of a
trustee acting in his own interest is equally significant when the trustee has a possessory
interest. See note 75 supra.
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deed, as earlier noted, it appears that only trustee independence
can check such inclinations.8 4
CONCLUSION

It has been demonstrated that disparagement of the trustee
independence requirement in the gift-leaseback context, evinced
by the majority and concurring opinions in May,s5 is unfounded.
Notably, since gift-leasebacks first were sanctioned by the courts,
not by Congress, and because Congress has not codified its opinion
respecting such arrangements, the judiciary has been left to its
own devices in determining when rental payments properly may be
deducted. In an attempt to lend consistency to this area of the tax
law, at least one commentator has suggested that the Clifford provisions of the Code should be used to test the deductibility of giftleaseback rental payments.8 " This solution would require legislation, however, since present Treasury regulations indicate that sections 671 through 678 of the Code are not applicable to deductibility.87 Whether the Clifford provisions are employed or whether a
new statutory scheme is devised, it is hoped that Congress will act
quickly to provide guidance for tax planners.
Nancy Scappaticci

11

See note 75 and accompanying text supra.

88 See 76 T.C. 7, 15 (1981); id. at 31-32 (Goffe, J., concurring).
86 See Note, Clifford Trusts: A New View Towards Leaseback Deductions, 43 ALE. L.
REV. 585, 594 (1979).
87 See Wiles v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 289, 298, 300 (1972), af'd mem., 491 F.2d 1406

(5th Cir. 1974); Treas. Reg. § 1.671-(1)(c) (1956).

